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Abstract 
 
This paper offers a framework for analyzing and comparing privacy and privacy protections across (inter 
alia) time, place, and polity and for examining factors that affect privacy and privacy protection. This 
framework provides a way to describe precisely aspects of privacy and context and a flexible vocabulary 
and notation for such descriptions and comparisons. Moreover, it links philosophical and conceptual work 
on privacy to social science and policy work and accommodates different conceptions of the nature and 
value of privacy. The paper begins with an outline of the framework. It then refines the view by describing 
a hypothetical application. The paper concludes with an argument that the framework offers important 
advantages to privacy scholarship and for privacy policy makers. 
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Introduction 
 
There is a substantial popular concern about privacy in light of technological advances, greater 
sharing of information via social networks, and increased power of state and non-state actors to collect 
information about individuals and institutions. That concern coincides with a growing body of privacy 
scholarship spanning a broad range of disciplines. One area of inquiry concerns making comparisons of 
privacy and protections in different places or at different times, for example across national boundaries 
(Regan 2010; Bennett 1992; Altman 1977; Spiro 1971). A related line of inquiry concerns contextual 
factors that affect privacy protections and privacy rights. For example, whether the search of one’s 
briefcase constitutes a privacy violation depends on the setting in which it occurs: an airport security 
zone, a public sidewalk, or elsewhere (Nissenbaum 2010). Although these lines of scholarship are 
important and growing, they are in their early stages. This paper seeks to advance the scholarship in 
making privacy comparisons by providing a framework and conceptual foundation for defining and 
identifying aspects of privacy and its context in order to better analyze privacy, privacy protections, and 
privacy rights.  
The framework we provide accomplishes several things. First, and most important, it provides a 
way to describe with precision particular aspects of privacy and privacy’s context. It also allows one to 
compare privacy in different settings according to variables such as time, location, and polity. To do so, it 
provides a flexible vocabulary and notation to facilitate such descriptions and comparisons. The 
framework provides, so far as possible, a morally neutral way of describing and comparing privacy states, 
and hence does not assume the answers to any questions about the moral importance of privacy in 
particular cases. Finally, the framework provides a way to link philosophical and conceptual work on 
privacy to social science and policy work by providing a tool for describing and comparing privacy that 
both instantiates aspects of the philosophical literature and can accommodate different conceptions of the 
nature and value of privacy itself.  
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The paper begins with a discussion of a number of conceptions of privacy and privacy 
protections. It will argue that those conceptions are incomplete, fail to capture the full range of possibilities 
for the state of personal privacy, and do not allow for comparisons of privacy states. We offer instead a 
conception that focuses on privacy as a three-part relation between some individual or institution, some 
domain of information, and some other individual or institution with respect to whom the first has (or lacks) 
privacy. Put another way, the three-part relation is a general feature of privacy, and any privacy state (i.e., 
state of affairs regarding the privacy of some individual or entity) can be expressed in terms of that three-
part relation. Rather than arguing for a particular conception of that relation, our view is compatible with a 
broad range of views about the nature and value of privacy. After setting forth this conception, we further 
specify the view by describing a hypothetical comparison across states.   
 
Privacy and Context 
 
Several things motivate this paper. One is scholarly interest in comparing the laws and norms 
protecting privacy across different states or countries. Relatedly, there are important questions 
surrounding the explanations for such differences. To understand how and why countries offer different 
types of privacy protections it will be useful to have a framework to systematically describe those 
differences. This interest in differences in privacy norms is manifest in recent scholarship focusing on 
privacy’s context. In her recent book Privacy in Context, Helen Nissenbaum makes the case that privacy 
norms must be understood in terms of “contextual integrity.” She argues that privacy losses are 
distressing when they violate informational norms, which is to say when they violate norms restricting 
flows of information. Important here is that those norms are “systematically related to characteristics of 
the background social situation.”(Nissenbaum 2010, 129) She maintains that “disparities across societies, 
cultures, and historical periods may manifest in differences” in privacy and informational 
norms.(Nissenbaum 2010, 134–35) Despite this emphasis on the social factors affecting informational 
norms, Nissenbaum leaves to “empirical social scientists” the question of how societal and cultural factors 
give rise to privacy and informational norms.  
 This paper takes up the task of understanding privacy’s context in three ways. First, it specifies 
several relevant aspects of any privacy context. Second, by imposing a structure on analyzing privacy it 
allows for comparisons across “societies, cultures, and historical periods” that may have different privacy 
norms, and allows one to analyze underlying causes of such differences. Thus, third, the framework 
provides a tool to predict what privacy norms will be and how they will change. 
 
The View 
 
 The foundation of our framework is that any conception of privacy must account for three things 
that stand in some relation to one another. So, for example, Martijn Blaauw argues that privacy is 
fundamentally about some person or persons, some set of propositions about the first person, and some 
other person or persons who know, or do not know, the propositions in the set (Blaauw n.d.). On this 
view, in order to understand Zeke’s privacy in health information, we must account not just for Zeke, but 
also for some set of propositions regarding Zeke’s health (e.g., propositions regarding Zeke’s medical 
history, physiological traits, habits, and so forth) and for some other person or persons who knows, or 
does not know each of the propositions regarding Zeke’s health. The key point here is that simply 
describing Zeke as having or lacking privacy is incomplete without specifying the range of propositions 
regarding which he has (or lacks) privacy and the other persons with respect to whom he has (or lacks) 
privacy. This is important, for one will often have privacy in some respects but not others. Zeke may have 
privacy regarding the set of propositions concerning his health with respect to his coworker, but not with 
respect to his insurer. And he may lack privacy regarding the set of propositions concerning his health 
with respect to his insurer but retain privacy regarding the set of propositions concerning his reading 
habits with respect to his insurer. Understanding privacy as a three-part relation forces us to be specific. 
 A related account is proffered in (Rubel 2011). Like Blaauw, Rubel argues that privacy should be 
understood as a three-part relation, though he articulates the relevant parts differently. On this view any 
particular instance of privacy must involve some person or persons P, some domain of information O, and 
some other person or persons Q. And for P to have privacy regarding O with respect to Q is for Q’s ability 
to make reasonable particularized judgments about P regarding O to be limited (Rubel 2011, 278–79). 
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Important for our purposes here is that by understanding privacy as necessarily involving three parts, we 
can use an expression such as POQ to denote any privacy instance or privacy state.  
 The difference between the Blaauw account and the Rubel account concerns the nature of the 
privacy relation. On Blaauw’s view, privacy is a knowledge relation. If we let O be the relevant set of 
propositions concerning P, on Blaauw’s view, P will have privacy regarding O with respect to Q if, and 
only if, Q does not know the propositions in O. In contrast, on the Rubel account privacy is about 
reasonable, particularized inferences, such that P has privacy regarding O with respect to Q to the extent 
that Q’s ability to make reasonable particularized judgments about P and O is limited. Suppose, for 
example, that Q reads P’s medical record, which states that P has Lyme disease. It would under normal 
circumstances be reasonable for Q to make the inference that P has Lyme disease, and hence P’s 
privacy regarding her health information (O) decreases with respect to Q. However, because Q can make 
such judgments without actually knowing propositions within the domain O, the Rubel account will 
recognize some cases as privacy losses that Blaauw would not so-recognize. Returning to the Lyme 
disease example, if P’s medical record states incorrectly that P has Lyme disease, Q’s reasonable 
inference would be false. Q would believe that P has Lyme disease and Q would be justified in that belief, 
but the belief would be false. Q therefore does not know that P has Lyme disease (for one cannot know 
something that is false). On a knowledge account of privacy, such that P’s privacy regarding O with 
respect to Q decreases only if Q gains knowledge of P regarding O, P’s privacy regarding his health 
status with respect to Q would not decrease. 
 What is important, though, is that despite this disagreement about the particular nature of the 
privacy relation, both accounts understand privacy as involving a three-part, or POQ, relation. More 
strongly, understanding privacy as involving a three-part relation is compatible with any plausible account 
of the nature of the privacy relation. Consider two of the predominant views of privacy in the literature: 
first, that privacy is fundamentally about access to information, and second, that privacy is about control 
of information. On access accounts, privacy turns on whether others physically access, cognitively 
access, or have the ability to physically or cognitively access one’s information. Thus, on access 
accounts, a person’s privacy does not depend on whether one has the ability to prevent others from 
impinging her privacy.
1
 On control views, one’s having privacy depends on whether one has the ability to 
decide who can access information about her. So, one can lose privacy if information about her is 
dispersed (and hence out of her control), even if others do not or cannot actually access that information.
2
 
Notice, though, that on either type of view, we can articulate some person P, some domain of information 
O, and some person or persons with respect to whom P has privacy regarding O. On access views, P will 
have privacy regarding O with respect to Q if Q’s access to O regarding P is limited in the relevant way. 
On control views, P will have privacy regarding O with respect to Q if P has the power to control whether 
Q can access information in O regarding P. 
 
Making Comparisons 
 
Fixing a means of denoting privacy relations (POQ) allows us to describe one privacy state in 
isolation. However, there are two problems. First, it is crucial for understanding privacy and context to be 
able to compare privacy across, for example, time, technology, place, and other relevant variables. Once 
researchers can make those comparisons with some precision, empirical social scientists can begin to 
account for the causes of any differences. Second, there are different conceptions of privacy (e.g., 
control, knowledge, access), all of which we want to be able to compare. That is, we do not want to tie 
this model to any particular conception of the nature of privacy. 
 In order to accommodate this last problem, we can use terms to represent particular conceptions 
of privacy that might obtain in any POQ relation. Hence, let   represent an access account of privacy, 
and  POQ represent a particular three-part privacy relation under that conception. Table 1 shows a 
standardized, but non-exclusive, set of terms to refer to four principal conceptions of privacy. 
 
                                                          
1
 Examples of access accounts include (Powers 1996; Allen 1988, 15; Gavison 1984, 349–50; Parent 1983, 269).   
2
 Examples of control accounts include (Moore 2010; Westin 1967, 7; Rachels 1975) 
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Table 1 
Privacy conceptions notation 
 
Conception of Privacy Associated Symbol  
Access    
Control    
Particularized Judgment   
Knowledge   
 
Consider the case of P’s privacy regarding his health information. We might want to compare P’s 
privacy in that regard with respect to various entities. So, P likely has relatively little privacy regarding his 
health information with respect to his doctor, but he might have more privacy in this regard with respect to 
his neighbor. To represent this difference we will need to expand our formula. Let P denote Peter, O1 
denote medical information, Q1 denote Peter’s doctor, and Q2 denote Peter’s neighbor. In the normal 
case, the following will be true:  
 
              
That is, Peter’s privacy regarding his medical information with respect to his doctor will be less than 
Peter’s privacy regarding his medical information with respect to his neighbor. Now, let O2 denote Peter’s 
gardening habits. The following will be true: 
 
              
 
That is, Peter’s privacy regarding his gardening habits with respect to his neighbor will be less than 
Peter’s gardening habits with respect to his doctor.  
 
However, if Peter’s doctor is the same person as Peter’s neighbor, then: 
 
              
And: 
              
 
This example simply analyzes a single subject (P) across different domains (O) and third parties 
(Q). The framework, though, helps us describe privacy relations according to variables such as time and 
location. Consider, for example, records of persons’ real property. In the U.S. municipalities’ real property 
records are public records and anyone may access those records. Prior to the digitization of those 
records, the uptake of the Internet, and the move to place public records online, one generally had to 
make a request by mail, by fax, or in person to receive those records, and one generally had to pay for 
processing, photocopying, and postage. Now, in many places one can simply enter a person’s name, a 
property address, or a parcel number in an online form and receive property records immediately and for 
free. We can represent this difference using our framework.  
 Let P represent a property owner in Greenacre, a municipality in the U.S. Let O represent 
information about real property (tax assessment value, property description, purchase price, 
encumbrances, and so forth). Let Q represent the general public. Suppose that in the pre-Internet era (T1) 
Greenacre kept its property records in paper files, which could be accessed in person at City Hall during 
standard business hours, for a standard fee. However, as of 2010 (T2) Greenacre keeps all of its property 
records in an electronic database, which may be accessed by members of the public on the city’s website 
free of charge.   
 We can easily see, in Table 2, the relation between privacy in Greenacre before and after the 
database. 
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Table 2 
Privacy state comparison across time 
 
Variable      
T1 
         T2 
Privacy relation           
 
 
We can replace the table by modifying the notation, including not only the privacy relation     , 
but also adding the relevant variable, in this case time (T1 and T2). Hence, we can represent the overall 
privacy relation of a property owner regarding information about her property with respect to the general 
public as follows:  
    
       
  
 
 
We can also construe the change at Greenacre as a change in technology rather than as a change in 
time. That is, we can analyze it as the difference between paper-based records and digitized, online 
records, represented slightly differently: 
    
          
       
 
 
Indeed, a similar notation can be used to represent whatever comparison one wishes to make. So, rather 
than comparing privacy in Greenacre over time or across technologies, we might instead wish to compare 
privacy regarding property information between Greenacre and Blueacre. If Blueacre, even at this late 
date, has not created an Internet-accessible electronic database of its property records, the following 
would represent property owner privacy in the two locales:  
 
    
             
         
 
We can also combine them: 
    
                  
              
 
Whereas: 
    
                  
              
 
 
 Hence, the framework here specifies and isolates aspects of privacy’s context, and is flexible 
enough to account for different variations. These include, but are not limited to, place, time, and 
technological developments. 
 
Toward Social Scientific Explanation of Variance 
 
This type of structured, rigorous analysis encourages us to look at privacy relations within specific 
situations: in particular places or times, or under various technological conditions. Once this work is 
complete, social scientists – and indeed all those who seek to determine the reasons behind the 
variations elicited – can treat the resulting privacy comparisons as bases for further research.  
For instance, once the privacy comparison related to presidential campaigns in the US and France 
presented above is established, scholars can seek to explain the causal factors behind the differences. It 
may well be that France’s political culture has been so influenced by the presence of a centralized, 
powerful state that its government is more likely to demand a fuller accounting of donations from its 
candidates. By comparison, Americans’ tendency toward skepticism, antagonism toward state action, or 
affinity for small-scale political actors may contribute to the exclusion of sub-$200 donations from federal 
reporting requirements.  
 We can also imagine any number of further applications and comparisons, depending on the 
interest of the social scientist or other analyst. Perhaps computer scientists, information scientists, and 
designers of technological systems will wish to evaluate the privacy impacts of existing technologies with 
an eye toward predicting privacy outcomes of future technologies (see, e.g., Detweiler et al. 2011). Or 
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sociologists may wish to look into the past to compare privacy states under various social regimes in 
order to make predictions about societal outcomes. Others may wish to examine privacy regimes in 
various historical periods to identify causes of differences in privacy protections.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our task here has been to advance privacy inquiry by providing a bridge between several discrete 
areas of privacy scholarship: work emphasizing the importance of privacy’s context, philosophical work 
regarding conceptions of privacy, and empirical social science looking at differences in privacy regimes 
and underlying causes of such difference. To do so we’ve offered a framework and conceptual foundation 
for isolating aspects of privacy and privacy’s context and for comparing other aspects of privacy’s context: 
privacy is a three-part relation between some person, persons, or entity P, some set of propositions or 
domain of information O, and some other person, persons, or entity Q with respect to whom P has privacy 
regarding O.  
 We have argued that the framework is important insofar as it forces specification regarding these 
three necessary aspects of privacy and, hence, allows for comparing privacy across contexts such as 
time, location, and polity. Although it forces some specificity, it is flexible insofar as it allows comparisons 
of myriad contexts and accommodates different philosophical conceptions of the nature of privacy 
(access, control, knowledge, inference) and types of privacy protections (legal, moral, technological). 
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